Articles

Many businesses were in the midst of implementing operational changes to function in the new UK/EU trading environment, when the COVID-19 pandemic affected the world in an unprecedented way. However, ahead of the industry is the Transition Period which will last until 31st December 2020. Until that time, UK airlines remain part of EASA and subject to the requirements of EU-Ops; operations to and from the EU 27 countries remain unhindered. However, there is much to achieve and a whole host of agreements have to be set in place if the United Kingdom are to exit the EU in an orderly fashion. It is possible that the UK could leave the EU with no agreement in place (a hard BREXIT). This raises the spectre of what happens to the UK aviation industry in the event of a no-deal exit?

In combination with a sound Safety Management System (SMS), the absence of an accident is sometimes used as a means to describe an organisation’s operation as “safe”. Is this really a valid argument? Do all organisations have a true picture of their safety landscape and have they been able to identify any close calls? Often it is the manifestation of a number of unknown and unrelated events that can result in a serious incident or accident. These events are usually an element of “business as usual” and occur every day as part of the normal operation.

The importance of active operational risk management should never be underestimated. As a former Flight Operations Manager, I have attended numerous Safety Meetings (DSAG and SAG) and the most common question is: “Has our risk picture changed in the last few months?” The answer, inevitably, is: “No, our risk register indicates that we have mitigated all risks to as low as reasonably practical.” Whilst this answer is technically correct it is often not a true reflection of the risk levels experienced in an organisation. Great operational risk management requires so much more.

Is it possible to determine the true risk landscape of your organisation? Ask safety managers this question and their answer may well be: “Of course we can as we have a risk register that indicates all known hazards and they have been mitigated to an acceptable level.” However, is this a true picture of the total risk faced at a corporate level and have all hazards been identified? Are there any latent issues lurking in the background just waiting to manifest as something more serious?

In aviation, practical drift is a set of circumstances where actual performance varies from the designed performance as a result of factors that may or may not be under the direct control of the organisation and, which may impact the safety management of the airline. ICAO believes that practical drift is inevitable, primarily due to human factors. A deviation from the norm can be harmonised through good processes, good analysis and good culture.

A mature safety management system will only perform effectively if safety analysis is a primary element. The objective of the safety analysis process is to extract useful information from the stored safety data and then display this information using graphs, tables, dashboards and presentations so that senior managers can make informed decisions on safety.